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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK--------------------------------------------------------------- x
ERIN PRIMMER,
Plaintiff, 08 Civ. 9422 (HB)
-against- OPINION & ORDER
CBS STUDIOS, INC.,
Defendant.
USDS SDNY  
DOCUMENT
ELECTRONICALLY FILED
DOC # :___________________
DATE FILED:
--------------------------------------------------------------- x
Hon. HAROLD BAER, JR., United States District Judge:
On November 3, 2008, Plaintiff Erin Primmer (“Primmer” or “Plaintiff’) filed a Complaint 
against Defendant CBS Studios, Inc. (“CBS” or “Defendant”) alleging that her employment as a 
television producer on the “Montel Williams Show” was terminated in violation of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., New York State Executive Law 
§ 296 (“NYSHRL”) and the Administrative Code of the City of New York §§ 8-107.16, 8-107.73 
and 8-107.15(a) (“NYCHRL”). Specifically, Primmer alleges that CBS terminated her 
employment based on discriminatory animus as a result of her having suffered a brain aneurysm in 
March 2007. CBS now moves for summary judgment on all of Primmer’s claims. CBS has filed 
a concomitant motion to strike certain portions of the affidavits of Primmer and her attorney 
Christopher Murray, submitted in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, as well as 
certain portions of Primmer’s Local Rule 56.1 Statement. For the reasons set forth below, 
Defendant’s motions are denied.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND'
Primmer began her employment as a Producer for the Montel Williams Show during 
Season 15 of the show in August 2005. Primmer was responsible for producing one one-hour 
show each week, which included “everything, from conception to completion” of the episode. 
Specifically, in carrying out her job duties, Primmer pitched show ideas for approval by Montel 
Williams (“Williams”), wrote the script for the show, wrote “pre-interview” notes that related to 
each guest so that Williams would be prepared to meet the guest on-the-air, briefed each guest, 
and briefed Williams as to what each guest would say on each show. In developing a pitch for a
1 On summary judgment, all inferences must be drawn in favor on the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., A ll  U.S. 242, 255 (1986). Accordingly, unless otherwise indicated, this section is based on Plaintiff’s 
Response to Defendant’s Rule 56.1 Statement.
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show idea, Primmer was responsible for drafting a “focus,” or an outline that defined the reason 
for the show, its relevance and what the show would entail. When Primmer was first hired, her 
supervisor was Executive Producer Diane Rappaport (“Rappaporf’). In late 2005, Susan Henry 
(“Henry”) and Kimberly Forman-Brechka (“Forman-Brechka”) were promoted to Co-Executive 
Producers and replaced Rappaport as Primmer’s direct supervisors. Although Williams had 
ultimate creative control over the content of the show and had creative input on each individual 
episode, during Season 16, CBS executive Alexandra Jewett (“Jewett”) became involved in the 
creative aspects of the show.
CBS contends, based on the deposition testimony of Williams and others, that Primmer’s 
work product during Season 15 was sub-par. E.g., Defendant’s Local Rule 56.1 Statement 
(“Def.’s 56.1 St.”) 13-20. Primmer vehemently disputes these characterizations of her work,
and attests that “at no time were any complaints with regard to [her] work performance 
communicated to [her].” Affidavit of Erin Primmer (“Primmer Aflf.”) f  5; see also id. at f f  7-8. 
Indeed, by letter dated September 19, 2005, an executive in charge of production of the Montel 
Williams Show wrote on Primmer’s behalf that “her prospects for continued employment and 
advancement are excellent.” Primmer Aff. Ex. B. However, by May 2006, Primmer herself noted 
that it had “been a challenging year for [her] with [Forman-Brechka] and even with [Williams].” 
Declaration of Laura Sack (“Sack Decl.”) Ex. J.
Ultimately, Primmer’s contract was renewed for Season 16 with a 6% increase in salary. 
Under the contract, Primmer’s employment was on a season-to-season basis, without a guarantee 
of continued employment for any subsequent season. Primmer understood that CBS was not 
obligated to offer her continued employment on any subsequent seasons of the Montel Williams 
Show. During the hiatus between Seasons 15 and 16, Williams and the executive producers 
denied Primmer’s request for a promotion to Senior Producer for Season 16. Defendant contends 
that Williams and other producers continued to experience problems with Primmer’s work 
performance during Season 16, e.g., Def.’s 56.1 St. 38-46, 65, a fact Primmer vehemently 
disputes. See Primmer Aff. 12-13. Although CBS contends that Williams communicated to 
Henry that he wanted to terminate Primmer’s employment as early as October 2006, Henry 
testified that she was not informed of the decision to terminate Primmer until approximately 
January 30, 2007. See Def.’s 56.1 St. 54; Deposition of Susan Henry (“Henry Dep.”) 44:7-16.
On January 30, 2007, the producers of the Montel Williams Show participated in a pitch 
meeting to prepare for the February sweeps event. Each producer was asked to present fully-
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fleshed out ideas at the meeting so that the February sweeps2 3could be planned out. Accordingly, 
each producer was expected to come to the meeting prepared to discuss topics and the data to 
support the topics. Primmer understood that, because CBS was scrutinizing the Montel Williams 
Show at the time, everyone was trying to “put their best foot forward” in their performance. After 
the January 30 meeting, Henry and Forman-Brechka warned Primmer that Williams was unhappy 
with her presentation at the meeting and that her ideas were not “up to par.” Henry and Forman- 
Brechka further informed Primmer that they were dissatisfied because the ideas she had pitched at 
the meeting had not been as detailed as they had expected. At their request, Primmer submitted 
revised versions of the ideas she had presented at the meeting. While CBS contends that 
Primmer’s work did not improve, Def.’s 56.1 St. ^ 92, Primmer disputes this fact, attesting that it 
was her understanding that Henry and Forman-Brechka were satisfied with her performance after 
she submitted her revised thoughts.
CBS contends that Williams communicated his desire for Primmer’s employment to be 
terminated immediately following the January 30 pitch meeting. Def.’s 56.1 St. 94. However, 
Primmer was not terminated at that time. CBS executives testified that the reason for their failure 
to terminate her at the time was that pursuant to her contract, if she were to be terminated before a 
certain date, CBS would be required to pay her out for a designated number of weeks, which the 
network was apparently unwilling to do. ■ See Def.’s 56.1 St. 98-104. Accordingly, Primmer 
continued to work on the Montel Williams Show through the spring of 2007.
On March 29, 2007, Primmer suffered a brain aneurysm and was rushed to the hospital for 
emergency surgery. After being released from the hospital two and a half weeks later, Primmer 
returned to the Montel Williams Show on several occasions, though she did not return to work full 
time as of yet because she had not yet been cleared to return. CBS continued to pay Primmer’s 
salary through the end of Season 16 and did not deduct from her accrued vacation time for the 
time she was on leave. Primmer was cleared by her physicians to return to work by the beginning 
of Season 17. However, in May 2007, before Season 17 began, Henry called a meeting with
2 November, February and May are “sweeps” months. During the sweeps event, advertising rates are set for the 
following period, so “shows generally try to put their best foot forward and get the highest ratings they can.” D ef.’s 
56.1 St. K 59-60. The higher a show’s ratings during sweeps, the more advertising dollars it can attract.
3 A cerebral aneurysm is a bulging weakness in the wall o f  an artery that supplies blood to the brain. In most cases, a 
cerebral aneurysm has no symptoms. In rare cases, the aneurysm can rupture, releasing blood into the skull and 
sometimes causing stroke. Such a rupture in a brain aneurysm is called a subarachnoid hemorrhage. Depending on the 
severity o f the hemorrhage, brain damage or death may result. See generally Jonathan L. Brisman, M.D., et al., 
Cerebral Aneurysms, 355 NEW ENGL. J. Me d . 928 (Aug. 31, 2006). In this case, there is no evidence in the record to 
show the extent or severity o f Primmer’s brain aneurysm.
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Primmer. During that meeting, Henry and Primmer discussed Primmer’s aneurysm, and Henry 
informed Primmer that they were sorry but they could not renew Primmer’s contract for Season 17 
because they needed “someone at the top of their game” and someone “who could handle the 
pressure.” Primmer’s employment therefore was terminated as of the end of Season 16. The 
Montel Williams Show was cancelled after Season 17.
II. MOTION TO STRIKE
CBS has moved to strike certain paragraphs of Primmer’s Response to its Local Rule 56.1 
Statement and the affidavits of Primmer and Murray submitted in opposition to CBS’s summary 
judgment motion. CBS offers various reasons for the referenced portions of the documents to be 
stricken, including that they contain legal argument and conclusory statements, are not based on 
personal knowledge, contain inadmissible hearsay, and/or contradict Primmer’s previous 
deposition testimony. CBS also argues that Primmer’s affidavit contains improper 
characterizations of evidence and makes unwarranted inferences from such evidence.
Defendant’s motion to strike the referenced portions of Primmer’s Response to its Rule 
56.1 Statement based on her failure to support certain contentions with citation to the record or to 
specifically admit or deny certain assertions is denied. This Court has broad discretion to accept 
Primmer’s 56.1 counterstatement, even if it does not comply strictly with the Rule’s requirements. 
See Photopaint Techs., LLC v. Smartlens Corp., 335 F.3d 152, 155 n.2 (2d Cir. 2003); Holtz v. 
Rockefeller & Co., 258 F.3d 62, 73 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding “while a court is not required to 
consider what the parties fail to point out in their Local Rule 56.1 statements, it may in its 
discretion opt to conduct an assiduous review of the record,” even where a party fails to comply 
with the local rules) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
With respect to the challenged portions of the affidavits, Rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure states that affidavits filed in connection with a summary judgment motion “shall 
be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and 
shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.” Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 56(e). Accordingly, “[a] court may . . . strike portions of an affidavit that are not based 
upon the affiant’s personal knowledge, contain inadmissible hearsay or make generalized and 
conclusory statements.” Hollander v. American Cyanamid Co., 172 F.3d 192, 198 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(emphasis added). However, nothing in the Federal Rules or the Local Rules of this District 
requires a court to strike such material. See Sauer haft v. Board o f Educ. o f the Hastings-on-
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Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 05 Civ. 09087 (PGG), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46196, at *29 
(S.D.N.Y. June 2, 2009). Rather, the Court “may decline to conduct a line-by-line analysis and 
simply disregard” any material that does not comply with Rule 56(e). Id. at *30; see also, e.g., 
LaSalle Bank Nat 7 Ass ’n v. Merrill Lynch Mortgage Lending, Inc., 04 Civ. 5452 (PKL), 2007 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59303, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2007); Rus, Inc. v. Bay Indus., Inc., 322 F. 
Supp. 2d 302, 207 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). Moreover, to the extent Primmer’s affidavit uses conclusory 
or argumentative language, the Court will not make the suggested inferences simply because 
Plaintiff has suggested them. See Parks v. Lebhar-Friedman, Inc., No. 04-7133 (DCP) (KNF), 
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63019, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2008) (“[T]he court will not strike 
immaterial, verbose, conclusory, or evidentiary allegations unless their presence prejudices 
Defendant.”) (citing Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Grinnell Corp., 287 F. Supp. 744, 747 
(S.D.N.Y. 1968)). Accordingly, I will disregard any materials contained in the affidavits or Local 
Rule 56.1 Counterstatement that I find to be improper under the Federal Rules, if any, and 
Defendant’s motion to strike such materials is denied.
III. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A. Legal Standard
A motion for summary judgment must be granted if the moving party shows “there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact” and that it “is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 56(c). In considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Anderson, A ll  U.S. at 255. 
Summary judgment should be granted “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to 
establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will 
bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, A ll  U.S. 317, 322 (1986). In showing 
the existence of a genuine issue of material fact, “the non-moving party may not rely on mere 
conclusory allegations nor speculation, but instead must offer some hard evidence showing that its 
version of the events is not wholly fanciful.” Golden Pac. Bancorp v. F.D.I.C., 375 F.3d 196, 200 
(2d Cir. 2004). Rather, she “must come forward with evidence sufficient to allow a reasonable 
jury to find in her favor.” Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2001); see also Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 56(e) (“When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in [the] 
rule,. . .  the adverse party’s response . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial.”). The facts presented must be in a form that would be admissible at trial.
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Major League Baseball Props., Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 309 (2d Cir. 2008). Even if the 
parties dispute material facts, summary judgment must be granted “unless there is sufficient 
evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.” Id. It has oft 
been noted that courts should be “particularly cautious about granting summary judgment to an 
employer in a discrimination case when the employer’s intent is in question.” Schwapp v. Town o f 
Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 110 (2d Cir. 1997); see also Almond v. Westchester County Dep ’t o f Corr.,
425 F. Supp. 2d 394, 398 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). However, summary judgment in a discrimination case 
“may still be appropriate if the plaintiff relies on conclusory allegations of discrimination and the 
employer provides a legitimate rationale for its conduct.” Figueroa v. New York City Health & 
Hosps. Corp, 500 F. Supp. 2d 224, 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
IV. DISCUSSION
A. ADA Claim
Primmer’s claim against CBS under the ADA arises out of allegations that CBS unlawfully 
discriminated against her due to a perceived disability. The ADA prohibits discrimination against 
a “qualified individual with a disability because of the disability” in, among other things, the 
“terms, conditions and privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Disability 
discrimination claims under the ADA are analyzed under the familiar burden-shifting framework 
established by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
See, e.g., Sista v. CDC Ixis N. Am., Inc., 445 F.3d 161, 169 (2d Cir. 2006). To survive summary 
judgment under the McDonnell Douglas analysis, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case 
of discrimination based on disability by demonstrating that (1) her employer is subject to the 
ADA; (2) she was disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (3) she was qualified to perform the 
essentia] functions of her job, with or without reasonable accommodation; and (4) she suffered an 
adverse employment action because of her disability. Giordano v. City ofN. Y., 274 F.3d 740, 747 
(2d Cir. 2001). To prove a prima facie case, i.e., these four prongs, the plaintiffs burden under 
McDonnell Douglas is “minimal.” Regional Econ. Cmty. Action Prog. v. City o f Middletown, 294 
F.3d 35, 50 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993)).
Once the plaintiff has shouldered its burden here, it is up to the defendant to come forward and to 
articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory purpose for having taken the adverse employment 
action. E.g., Sista, 445 F.3d at 169. The defendant’s burden in this regard is only one of 
production, not of persuasion. That is, the defendant need only articulate a nondiscriminatory
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purpose supported by admissible evidence that, if believed by the trier of fact, would support a 
finding that unlawful discrimination was not the cause of the employment action; the defendant 
need not persuade the Court that the proffered purpose was in fact its reason for having taken the 
challenged employment action. See Fisher v. Vassar College, 114 F.3d 1332,1335-36 (2d Cir. 
1998) (quoting Texas Dep’t o f Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981)). The plaintiff 
then has an opportunity to demonstrate that the defendant’s proffered reasons were merely a 
pretext for discrimination. E.g.,Sista, 445 F.3d at 169. In showing a pretext, the plaintiff need 
only show that discrimination was “at least one of the motivating factors” in the employer’s 
decision. Holcomb v. Iona Coll, 521 F.3d 130, 138 (2d Cir. 2008). Throughout this analysis, 
“[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated 
against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.” Rambacher v. Bemus Point Cent. Sch. 
Dist., 307 Fed. Appx. 541, 543 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Patterson v. County o f Oneida, 375 F.3d 
206, 221 (2d Cir. 2004)).
1. Prima Facie Claim
CBS does not dispute that it is an employer covered by the ADA. Likewise, CBS does not 
dispute that Primmer was qualified to perform the essential functions of her job.4 Accordingly, the 
only disputed elements of Primmer’s prima facie claim are Elements 2 and 4 -  that is, whether 
Primmer was “disabled” under the ADA and whether CBS chose not to renew her contract for an 
additional season on account of that disability.
a. Was Primmer “Disabled” Under the ADA ?
Under the ADA, a “disability” is defined as (A) a physical or mental impairment that 
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of an individual, (B) a record of such 
impairment, or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).5 The
4 CBS does note, in a footnote in its memorandum o f  law, that because it has contended that certain executives and 
superiors found Primmer’s work product to be unsatisfactory, “the Court could readily conclude that she is unable to 
meet the third prong o f  her prima facie burden.” However, CBS has given the Court no reason to find in its favor on 
this element o f  the prima facie case, and in any event, because the argument is made wholly in a footnote in its brief, 
the Court may choose to disregard it. See In re Worldcom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 308 F. Supp. 2d 214, 231 n.24 (S D N Y 
2004).
5 In September 2008, Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendment Act o f  2008 (“ADAAA”), 
which expanded the class o f  individuals who are entitled to protection under the definition o f “disability” under the 
ADA. See Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, 3554. As the Ninth Circuit recently explained, “[i]n the ADAAA, 
Congress emphasizes that when it enacted the ADA in 1990, it intended that the Act provide a clear and 
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination o f discrimination against individuals with disabilities and provide 
broad coverage.” Rohr v. Salt River Proj. Agric. Import & Power Dist., 555 F.3d 850, 853 (9th Cir. 2009). 
Accordingly, the ADAAA rejects the Supreme Court’s narrow interpretation o f  the term “disability” in Sutton v.
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existence of a disability must be determined on a “case-by-case” basis. Capobianco v. City o f 
N.Y., 422 F.3d 47, 56 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Toyota, 534 U.S. at 198). In this case, Plaintiffs 
disability discrimination claim is premised on the third type of disability -  that is, she claims that 
although she is not disabled, her claim falls within the purview of the ADA because CBS wrongly 
regarded her as being disabled.
A “regarded as” claim under the ADA “turns on the employer’s perception of the 
employee and is therefore a question of intent, not whether the employee has a disability.”
Colwell v. Suffolk County Police Dep’t, 158 F.3d 635, 646 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted). That is, “[a]n employer runs afoul of the ADA when it makes an 
employment decision based on a physical or mental impairment, real or imagined, that is regarded 
as substantially limiting a major life activity.” Sutton, 527 U.S. at 490. It is not sufficient for a 
plaintiff to show that the employer perceived her as being “somehow disabled;” rather, the 
employer must regard the employee as “disabled within the meaning of the ADA.” Colwell, 158 
F.3d at 646 (emphasis omitted); see also Roberts v. The Health Ass ’n, 308 Fed. Appx. 568, 570 
(2d Cir. 2009); Capobianco, 422 F.3d at 57. Not every impairment is a “disability” within the 
meaning of the ADA; rather, the impairment must both limit a major life activity and the 
limitation must be substantial. Capobianco, 422 F.3d at 56. A “major life activity” is one that is 
“of central importance to daily life,” including functions such as caring for oneself, walking, 
seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning and working. Id.\ see also Toyota, 534 U.S. at 197; 
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). To determine whether a major life activity is substantial and limiting, a 
court may look to several factors, including (1) the nature and severity of the impairment, (2) its 
duration or expected duration, and (3) the existence of any actual or expected permanent or long 
term impact. Capobianco, 422 F.3d at 57 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)).
United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) and Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002). The 
ADAAA expressly delayed its effective date until January 1, 2009, two months after Primmer filed her complaint in 
this matter. Id. § 8, 122 Stat. at 3559. Primmer acknowledges that all courts, in this Circuit and elsewhere, that have 
addressed the question o f  whether the ADAAA applies retroactively to claims filed before its effective date have 
answered in the negative. See, e.g., Lytes v. DC Water & Sewer Auth., 572 F.3d 936 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Milhollandv. 
Sumner County Bd. of Educ., 569 F.3d 562, 567 (6th Cir. 2009); Linder v. Potter, No. CV-05-0062-FVS, 2009 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 72941, at *37 (E.D. Wash. Aug. 18, 2009); Moen v. Genesee County Friend o f the Court, No. 2:08-cv- 
12824, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57177, at *16 (E.D. Mich. July 6, 2009); Guary v. Upstate Nat'l Bank, 618 F. Supp. 2d 
272, 275 n.l (W .D.N.Y. 2009); Fournier v. Payco Foods Corp., 611 F. Supp. 2d 120, 129 n.9 (D.P.R. 2009); White v. 
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 07-CV-4286 (NGG) (MDG), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35554, at *17-18 n.7 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 
2009). Nonetheless, Primmer invites this Court to take the unprecedented approach o f applying the broader definition 
o f  “disability” under the ADAAA to the instant case. This I decline to do. However, the question o f  whether the 
ADAAA applies retroactively is immaterial to this case because, as discussed in further detail below, I find that 
Primmer has raised a genuine issue o f  material fact as to whether CBS regarded her as disabled under the pre- 
ADAAA definition.
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Where, as here, the major life activity in which a plaintiff alleges she was perceived to be 
substantially limited is working, the plaintiff must show that the employer perceived that she was 
“precluded from more than one type of job, a specialized job, or a particular job of choice.”
Sutton, 527 U.S. at 491. Rather, to prevail, Primmer must show that CBS regarded her as 
precluded from a broad class of jobs by virtue of her perceived disability. Id.’, Bartlett v. New 
York State Bd. o f Law Examiners, 226 F.3d 69, 82-83 (2d Cir. 2000).6 That is, Primmer must do 
more than establish that CBS believed that she suffered from an impairment that prevented her 
from working in the job she previously had; she must show that CBS believed she was prevented 
from working a broad class of jobs.
In this case, drawing all inferences in favor of Primmer, as I must, I find that she has 
presented sufficient evidence to show that CBS regarded her as substantially limited in the major 
life activity of working. Primmer has presented facts that, shortly after her release from the 
hospital following her brain aneurysm, Henry called her into a meeting at which her aneurysm was 
discussed and Henry told her that they needed “someone at the top of their game” and someone 
“who could handle the pressure.” Moreover, Primmer attests that, but for one incident, she was 
never advised that her performance was unsatisfactory by any of her superiors; and yet upon her 
return she was suddenly treated differently. Certainly this is evidence from which a jury could 
find that CBS believed her to be significantly restricted in her ability to work. See Denardi v.
DRA Imaging, P.C., 605 F. Supp. 2d 550, 555-56 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (finding evidence illustrative of 
a significant change in the way defendants treated plaintiff after cancer treatment was sufficient 
for reasonable jury to find defendants believed plaintiff was disabled under the ADA).
Moreover, based on the undisputed facts surrounding Primmer’s responsibilities as a 
producer on the Montel Williams Show, it does not appear that such a position entailed any great 
degree of specialized knowledge, training or expertise so that CBS perceived her only as being 
unable to work in her current position. That is, there is no reason why television production, or 
mass-media production, should not be regarded as a “broad class” of jobs such as being a teacher 
or a lawyer. CBS contends that Henry’s comments during the May 2007 meeting with Primmer 
indicated only that Season 17 was expected to be critical and more stressful, and therefore, if
6 The EEOC, the agency that bears the responsibility to implement specific provisions o f the ADA, has promulgated 
regulations that define “substantially limits” where the activity is “working” as to “significantly restrict!] in the ability 
to perform either a class o f  jobs or a broad range o f  jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having 
comparable training, skills and abilities. The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a 
substantial limitation in the major life activity o f working.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3); see also Giordano, 21A F.3d at 
747-48.
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anything, the comment reflected a belief that Primmer was unable to perform her specific role. To 
the contrary, Henry’s comments contained no such limitations, and a reasonable jury could 
interpret them to mean that Primmer was viewed at CBS as someone who was unable to handle 
any position that involved stress. Further, unlike the cases cited by CBS, where the employer 
specifically referred to the plaintiffs inability to cope with a specific position, praised her skills, 
offered her a different position, or wrote her a recommendation to obtain other employment, in 
this case CBS did no such thing. E.g., Ryan v. Grae & Rybicki, P.C., 135 F.3d 867, 872-73 (2d 
Cir. 1998); Pikoris v. Mount Sinai Med Ctr., 96 Civ. 1403 (JFK), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7350, at 
*38-39 (S.D.N.Y. May 30, 2000); c f Howell v. New Haven Bd. ofEduc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 286, 292 
(D. Conn. 2004) (denying summary judgment on ADA claim even where “the fact that Howell 
was transferred to a teaching position at another school is powerful evidence that the Board of 
Education did not perceive Howell as disabled within the meaning of the ADA”) (emphasis 
added). Accordingly, Primmer has raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether CBS 
regarded her as disabled under the ADA.
b. Did Primmer Raise an Inference of Discriminatory Intent?
To satisfy her burden on the fourth prong of her prima facie claim, Primmer must show 
that she was terminated under circumstances that give rise to an inference of discriminatory intent. 
E.g., Denardi, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 555 (citing Debidat v. Marriott Int7, Inc., 580 F. Supp. 2d 300, 
305 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)); see also Holcomb, 521 F.3d at 139. Drawing all permissible factual 
inferences in plaintiffs favor, I find that the evidence adduced by Primmer passes the test.
CBS contends that the record shows Williams made his decision that Primmer’s contract 
would not be renewed as of the fall of 2006, or alternatively, after the January 30, 2007 pitch 
meeting. CBS maintains that Primmer was not let go at that time because the cost of paying her 
out under her contract would have been too great and that she was needed during February 
sweeps. In short, CBS claims that because it had already decided not to renew Primmer’s 
employment contract before the aneurysm, it could not have made that decision as a result of the 
aneurysm. However, Primmer has raised genuine issues of material fact as to when CBS in fact 
decided to terminate her employment. Specifically, as noted above, Primmer notes that other than 
on one occasion, she was never advised that her performance was unsatisfactory or that her 
continued employment was in jeopardy. Indeed, on that one occasion -  following the January 30 
pitch meeting -  Primmer revised her pitch presentation and was never advised that it remained
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unsatisfactory in any way7 Further, although Williams testified that he began to feel disappointed 
with Primmer’s performance during Season 15, Primmer’s contract nonetheless was renewed for 
Season 16 with a 6% salary increase. Moreover, the record in this case is absolutely devoid of any 
contemporaneous writings -  be they internal memoranda, emails or diary entries -  that show any 
indication that any of Primmer’s direct supervisors was dissatisfied with her performance prior to 
her aneurysm.7 8 On the other hand, Henry’s comments at the May 2007 meeting, or what might 
better be characterized as an exit interview, about her aneurysm and that they needed “someone at 
the top of their game” and someone “who could handle the pressure” certainly allows a reasonable 
jury to decide that the decision not to renew Primmer’s contract was motivated, at least in part, on 
her perceived disability, especially given the relatively close proximity between Primmer’s return 
to the office following her recovery from the aneurysm and her meeting with Henry. See, e.g., 
Droutman v. New York Blood Ctr., Inc., 03-CV-5384, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42951, at *15 
(E.D.N.Y. July 27, 2005) (“The temporal proximity of an employee’s disclosure of a disability and 
her termination helps support an inference of disability discrimination.”). In short, Primmer has 
raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether CBS chose not to renew her contract on 
account of her perceived disability.
7 One o f Defendant’s primary objections to Primmer’s attempt to raise issues o f fact is that such attempt is based in 
large measure on her own “self-serving” affidavit. However, precedent in this Circuit makes clear that certain 
uncorroborated affidavits by the non-moving party, standing alone, may be sufficient to create a genuine issue o f 
material fact sufficient to survive summary judgment in a discrimination case. As the Second Circuit has held:
[i]n discrimination cases, the only direct evidence available very often centers on 
what the defendant allegedly said or did. . . Since the defendant will rarely admit 
to having said or done what is alleged . . .  the issue frequently becomes one o f  
assessing the credibility o f  the parties. At summary judgment, however, that issue 
is necessarily resolved in favor o f  the nonmovant. To hold, as defendants ask us 
to do, that the nonmovant’s allegations o f  fact are (because “self-serving”) 
insufficient to fend o ff  summary judgment would be to thrust the courts -  at an 
inappropriate stage -  into an adjudication o f the merits. Such a radical change in 
the courts’ role would be inappropriate not just in the discrimination context, but 
everywhere.
See, e.g., Danzer v. Norden Sys., Inc., 151 F.3d 50, 57 (2d Cir. 1998); see also Jenkins v. Area Cooperative Educ. 
Servs., 248 F. Supp. 2d 117, 126-27 (D. Conn. 2003); Upper Hudson Planned Parenthood, Inc. v. Doe, 90-CV-1084, 
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6263, at *14 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 1999).
8 There is one memorandum dated February 1, 2007 from Erik Sulcs, Supervising Field Producer, to Henry and 
Forman-Brechka, that relays the complaints o f Jen Madden, a Field Producer, relating to Primmer’s performance on a 
particular segment or episode. See Sack Decl. Ex. M. However, beside the fact that this document contains several 
levels o f  hearsay, there is no indication that these complaints were ever imparted to Primmer, or that Henry or 
Forman-Brechka shared Madden’s views or took any action on them.
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2. Legitimate Non-Discriminatorv Purpose
Primmer having satisfied her burden on the first prong of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, 
the burden of going forward shifts to CBS to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory purpose for 
its decision not to renew Primmer’s employment contract for Season 17 of the Montel Williams 
Show. CBS indisputably has shouldered this minor burden by showing that Primmer’s 
employment contract was not renewed because her performance was below expectations and 
unsatisfactory to her supervisors and to Williams. Even Primmer does not dispute that her 
unsatisfactory job performance, if true, would be a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for CBS to 
choose not to renew her contract. Accordingly, no more need be said on this prong of the analysis, 
and the burden now shifts back to Primmer to show that this proffered reason is merely a pretext 
for discriminatory animus based on her perceived disability.
3. Pretext
A plaintiff alleging employment discrimination may show pretext where “the employer’s 
given legitimate reason is unworthy of credence,” Dister v. Continental Group, Inc., 859 F.2d 
1108, 1113 (2d Cir. 1988), “by reliance on the evidence comprising the prima facie case, without 
more,” Chambers v. TRMCopy Ctrs. Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 28 (2d Cir. 1994), or “by demonstrating 
that similarly situated employees outside the protected class were treated differently.” Bennett v. 
Watson Wyatt & Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 236, 249 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). An employment discrimination 
plaintiff may also demonstrate pretext by showing “such weaknesses, implausibilities, 
inconsistencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that 
a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of credence and hence infer that the 
employer did not act for the asserted non-discriminatory reasons.” Droutman, 2005 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 42951 at *25 (citation omitted).
In this case, all the same evidence that raised factual issues with respect to Primmer’s 
prima facie case apply equally to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether CBS’s 
proffered reasons for terminating her employment were pretextual. To wit, the lack of evidence of 
any poor performance evaluations during Primmer’s employment history, lack of prior notice of 
underperformance, the renewal of Primmer’s contract with a 6% salary increase after Williams 
purportedly began to experience disappointment with Primmer’s work product, and the fact that 
Primmer was first alerted to the fact that her contract would not be renewed at a meeting with 
Henry in which Henry made comments that were fairly traceable to her perceived disability,
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combined with the proximity of her termination as compared to her return to work after her 
aneurysm, taken together are sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact with respect to 
discriminatory animus.
* * *
At its core, this case paints the classic he-said/she-said scenario, which involves an 
assessment of credibility and the resolution of competing inferences from the disputed facts. 
Neither is for the Court to decide. Accordingly, summary judgment on Primmer’s ADA claim 
must be denied. See Reeves v. Johnson Controls WorldServs., Inc., 140 F.3d 144, 155 (2d Cir. 
1998) (“To the extent these inconsistencies [between plaintiffs and defendant’s version of events] 
can only be resolved based upon credibility determinations, such questions of witness credibility 
are to be decided by the jury.”); Rodriguez v. City ofN.Y., 72 F.3d 1051, 1061 (2d Cir. 1995) (“On 
a summary judgment motion, the court is not to weigh the evidence, or assess the credibility of 
witnesses, or resolve issues of fact.”).
B. NYSHRL and NYCHRL Claims
Like the ADA, both the NYSHRL and NYCHRL forbid employers to discharge or change 
the conditions of employment of an employee because of a disability. See N.Y. Exec. L. § 
296(l)(a); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(1 )(a). The only major difference in the analysis of 
disability discrimination under the state and city statutes as compared to the ADA is that the 
definition of disability under the former is considerably broader than the ADA definition, at least 
before the amendments of 2008. See, e.g., Denardi, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 557. NYSHRL and 
NYCHRL claims are analyzed under the same McDonnell Douglas framework as ADA. Ferraro 
v. Kellwood Co., 440 F.3d 96, 99-100 (2d Cir. 2006). Therefore, the same analysis of Primmer’s 
claims for discrimination based on a perceived disability apply equally to her claims under the 
NYSHRL and NYCHRL, and summary judgment on those claims must be denied for all the same 
reasons discussed above.
IV. CONCLUSION
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED. Defendant’s motion to strike is 
also DENIED. This matter will go forward to trial on all of Primmer’s claims as scheduled in 
November 2009. A trial notification setting forth a date certain for trial and the deadlines for 
submission of pretrial materials will be transmitted to the parties in due course. The Clerk of this
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Court is directed to close these motions (Docket Nos. 18 and 26) and remove them from my
docket.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
New York, New York 
September ~^r , 2009
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